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This paper analyzes mergers and acquisitions (M&A) as a previously neglected channel of 
industrial restructuring in the face of trade liberalization. Using the Canada-United States 
Free Trade Agreement of 1989 as a natural experiment, I show that trade liberalization leads 
to a significant increase in M&A activity. I also provide evidence that resources are 
transferred from less to more productive firms in the process and that the magnitude of the 
overall transfer is quantitatively important. Taken together, these results suggest that M&A is 
an important alternative to the previously studied adjustment channels of firm and 
establishment closure and contraction. This has strong implications for the design of 
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1 Introduction
Recent economic research on the e¤ects of trade liberalization has highlighted the im-
portance of studying the rm- and establishment-level adjustment processes triggered by
freer trade (a short and inexhaustive list of contributions includes Tybout et al., 1991;
Tybout and Westbrook, 1995; Pavcnik, 2002; and Treer, 2004). A central insight from
these studies is that a substantial part of the impact of freer trade works through a reallo-
cation of resources across individual plants and rms. In particular, the contraction and
exit of low productivity establishments and the expansion of more productive ones can
explain a sizeable share of aggregate productivity increases found in the wake of trade
liberalizations (see Pavcnik, 2002; and Treer, 2004).
While this literature has thus demonstrated the general importance of micro-level
resource reallocation in understanding the e¤ects of freer trade, the central issue of how
resources are transferred between individual rms is still not su¢ ciently well understood.
In particular, only scarce attention has been paid to resource transfers through the mar-
ket for corporate control, i.e. through mergers and acquisitions (M&A). This is despite
the fact that M&A can, in principle, play a similar role as the adjustment processes high-
lighted in the existing literature. Instead of closing down establishments, reducing output
or exiting altogether, rms also have the option to search for buyers interested in parts
or the whole of their operations. Similarly, expanding rms can buy and integrate other
rms rather than expand production at existing plants or open new ones. Establishment-
level studies which focus on plant-level contraction, exit or expansion implicitly ignore
this potential margin of adjustment since they do not look at changes in ownership at
continuing plants.1
The purpose of this paper is to investigate empirically whether M&A does indeed play
a role in industrial restructuring in the face of trade liberalization. This is important for
a number of reasons. First, studying M&A is necessary to obtain a more complete pic-
ture of the mechanisms rms use to adjust to freer trade and of the extent of inter-rm
resource transfers involved in this adjustment. Second, M&A is not just another way of
transferring resources but is likely to be qualitatively di¤erent from the other adjustment
forms in that it is swifter and potentially more e¢ cient. Instead of workers and capi-
tal becoming unemployed for some period before being rehired, acquisitions allow for an
immediate transfer into new ownership. Also, M&A allows the takeover of entire pro-
duction structures which may be most e¢ cient if preserved as a whole. Finally, knowing
whether or not M&A plays an important role in rm adjustment to freer trade might also
shed new light on results from previous plant-level studies. For example, reallocations
1Similarly, a smaller group of papers that use rms rather than plants or establishments as their
unit of analysis focus on exit by bankruptcy as the principal form of adjustment and do not consider
M&A (see for example Gu, 2003; or Baggs, 2004). Note that throughout this paper, I will use the words
establishmentand plantinterchangeably to denote a unit of production within a rm.
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of control rights at existing establishments and ensuing restructuring undertaken by the
new management might be part of the reason for the important within-plant increases in
productivity found in many studies (e.g. Tybout and Westbrook, 1995; Pavcnik, 2002).
The particular liberalization episode I will study in this paper is the Canada-United
States Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) of 1989. As will be argued in more detail,
CUSFTA provides an ideal setting for the purpose of this study. Most importantly, it
represented a clear-cut and unanticipated policy experiment which was not introduced in
response to macroeconomic shocks nor accompanied by other major economic reforms.
Furthermore, the main policy instrument used (tari¤ cuts) is easily quantiable and
shows a large variation across sectors. Finally, the large size di¤erence between the
treaty partners and the implied variation in expected responses to the integration shock
further increases the potential for convincing econometric identication.
Against this background, I will present three main sets of ndings. In a rst step,
I examine whether there is evidence that CUSFTA led to more M&A activity. Using a
di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach, I nd a substantial increase in the number of domestic
Canadian transactions which is positively correlated with the magnitude of tari¤ cuts
across sectors. There is also an e¤ect on domestic U.S. M&A activity but one that is much
less pronounced than in Canada, consistent with the idea that CUSFTA presented the
bigger shock for the smaller Canadian market. Cross-border transactions show substantial
changes around the implementation of CUSFTA as well, although the link to tari¤ cuts
is less clear cut. In a second step, I examine rm-level characteristics of targets and
acquirers in order to investigate whether acquisitions involve a transfer of resources from
less to more productive rms, as seems to be the case for the previously studied channels
of adjustment (exit and contraction). This is indeed what I nd: acquirers tend to
be bigger, more protable and more productive. In a nal step, I look at the amount
of inter-rm transfers of output and employment in North America that were due to
M&A during my sample period 1985-1997. Comparing results to resource transfers via
exit and contraction, I nd that M&A was quantitatively important relative to these
alternative channels of adjustment. Taken together, these results suggest that M&A is
an important alternative to the adjustment mechanisms of rm and establishment closure
and contraction that have been emphasized in earlier research.
A number of recent theoretical contributions in International Trade have also studied
rm-level reallocation processes triggered by trade liberalization (Melitz, 2003; Bernard
et al., 2003; Bernard, Redding and Schott, 2004; and Falvey, Greenaway and Yu, 2004).
Similar to the empirical literature on plant- and rm-level adjustment by which they were
motivated, however, they do not examine M&A as a form of resource transfer. Another
group of papers in International Trade does look at M&A but mostly in the form of cross-
border transactions and in the context of foreign direct investment (e.g. Görg, 2000; Horn
and Persson, 2001; Nocke and Yeaple, 2004; di Giovanni, 2005). Rather than analyzing
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M&A as a means of industry restructuring, they examine its role as an alternative form
of foreign market access in addition to greeneld investment and exports. Bertrand and
Zitouna (2005) and Neary (2005) present models in which M&A is a way of restructuring
industries after trade liberalization, but they also restrict their analysis to cross-border
mergers. In contrast, several theoretical contributions in Industrial Organization have
directly focused on M&A as a mechanism for transferring resources between domestic
rms. In particular, Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002, 2004) use models with heterogenous
rms to show how M&A can serve as a complement to exit and internal adjustment
to rm- and industry-specic shocks. However, they restrict their attention to closed-
economy settings and only analyze domestic shocks.
On the empirical side, contributions in Corporate Finance and Industrial Organization
have since long pointed out that M&A can play a substantial role in restructuring indus-
tries and that its consequences go far beyond a mere change in ownership (e.g. Jensen,
1993; Kaplan, 2000; Copeland et al., 2003). Specically related to the question at hand,
authors like Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) or Andrade and Sta¤ord (2004) have shown
that M&A is indeed frequently used as a way of rm expansion and complements or
replaces internal investment in that respect. Comparisons of empirical studies also show
that acquisitions perform very similarly to other forms of investment in terms of abnormal
stock market returns (Andrade et al., 2001). On the targets side, takeovers usually bring
large abnormal gains in share prices and most acquired assets show signicant increases
in productivity (Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001; Andrade et al., 2001). Finally, a number
of recent studies have succeeded in directly linking increases in M&A activity to domestic
shocks like deregulation and nancial innovation (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996; Mulherin
and Boone, 2000; Andrade and Sta¤ord, 2004). The question of whether M&A also plays
a role in the industrial restructuring necessitated by trade liberalization shocks, however,
has not yet been addressed in a rigorous way. While there is some descriptive and anec-
dotal evidence to the a¢ rmative (Chudnovsky, 2000; OECD, 2001), no clear econometric
results have been presented sofar.2 This is the gap the present contribution tries to ll.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model
of trade liberalization and resource transfer via M&A. This section is intended to highlight
the principal economic mechanisms at work and to give some guidance for the subsequent
empirical analysis. Section 3 provides additional background information on CUSFTA
2An earlier study by Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) and a recent working paper by Greenaway et al.
(2005) present (mixed) evidence on the link between import penetration rates and M&A. However, since
there is no exogenous variation in this measure of exposure to trade, it is not obvious whether their
results can be interpreted in favor or against a link between trade liberalization and M&A. For example,
any negative productivity shock that triggers restructuring of a given industry is likely to involve M&A
(see Andrade et al., 2001). At the same time, the decline in the sectors relative productivity as compared
to the rest of the world will lead to more imports and a higher import penetration rate. Such issues are
reminiscent of the problems which plagued earlier studies on the link between trade and mark-ups, rm
size or productivity (as discussed in Tybout, 2001, or Fernandes, 2003).
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and section 4 describes the data. Section 5 proceeds to an empirical investigation of
changes in M&A activity in the wake of CUSFTA, section 6 compares characteristics of
targets and acquirers and section 7 provides evidence on the quantitative importance of
M&A as a form of resource transfer. I conclude with a summary of ndings and directions
for future research (section 8).
2 Theoretical Framework
How might trade liberalization lead to increases in M&A activity? This section presents a
simple model of M&A as a means of resource transfer between rms in order to illustrate
one potential mechanism. The models underlying idea is that all rms possess assets
that are of interest to other rms, like specic production skills, marketing capabilities or
physical capital (in the following I will simply talk of capital). Changes in demand and
supply conditions will lead to changes in rm-specic demand for these assets, with ex-
panding rms wanting to increase their stocks and contracting rms looking for potential
buyers. The M&A market then provides a channel through which the necessary transfer
can take place. Against this background, I study the e¤ect of the demand shock arising
from bilateral trade liberalizations such as CUSFTA. The crucial feature of this shock
is its di¤erential e¤ect across rms with di¤erent levels of productivity. As a number of
studies have shown, setting up export activities is costly and requires an initial investment
(see Roberts and Tybout, 1997; Bernard and Jensen, 2004). Thus, only more productive
rms that can a¤ord these xed costs will benet from liberalization through increased
exporting opportunities. Low productivity rms, in contrast, will su¤er lower prots due
to more intense product market competition from foreign rms while at the same time
being unable to benet from better access to the foreign market.3 Thus, while exporters
need additional capital in order to expand operations, non-exporters attach less value to
their existing capital stock. The presence of an M&A market then allows the two parties
to engage in a mutually benecial transfer of capital.
The model presented below tries to capture this intuition in the simplest possible
framework, building on the earlier contributions by Melitz (2003) and Jovanovic and
Rousseau (2002). I analyze a setting with two symmetric countries in which M&A is
used to transfer capital between rms with di¤erent productivity levels. I start in an
initial steady state equilibrium in which rms have already acquired the optimal capital
stocks associated with the prevailing level of trade costs. I then shock this equilibrium by
an unanticipated lowering of trade barriers which triggers a transfer of capital via M&A
from non-exporters to exporters (i.e. from less productive to more productive rms).
3This di¤erential e¤ect of bilateral trade liberalizations across rms is also analyzed in Melitz (2003).
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2.1 Model Setup and Initial Equilibrium
Following Melitz (2003), I analyze a setting with two symmetric countries, home and
foreign. In each country, rms produce di¤erentiated varieties under monopolistic com-
petition. Constant per-period demand in the initial steady state is generated by standard
CES preferences:
u(q) =
Z
" 
q()
 1
 d
 
 1
where   is the set of varieties available (both domestically produced and imported) and
q() is consumption of any given variety. Utility maximization by consumers yields
demand (q) and expenditure levels (r) of any variety  as q() = p() P  1E and
r() = p()1 P  1E. In these expressions, p() is the price of variety ,  > 1 the
elasticity of substitution between any two varieties and P the CES price index dened as
P =
hR
" 
p()1 d
i 1
1 
. Total expenditure E consists of aggregate prots only which I
normalize to one in the following.
Turning to the supply side, I assume for simplicity that varieties are produced using
non-depreciating capital (k) as the only factor of production. Firms are heterogenous in
productivity levels (') and the amount of capital required to produce a given amount of
output (q) is given by k = q
'
+ F . This production function implies a minimum capital
stock of F which rms need to acquire in order to enter the market.
Both economies are endowed with a xed capital stock of K which is owned by rms.
Capital is traded on anM&Amarket at a price of i=(1 ) where  is the exogenously given
and time-invariant discount factor (and i is thus the amortized per-period cost of acquiring
one unit of capital). Writing the M&A price in this way facilitates the comparison of
lifetime revenues and costs needed below for the rmsoptimization problem. Capital
acquired on the M&Amarket takes on the acquirers productivity ' after acquisition but I
assume that the targets variety cannot be used.4 Note that it would be straightforward to
allow for internal investment or a market for used capital as additional channels through
which rms can adjust their capital stocks. Since none of the principal ndings would
be changed by these extensions, however, I prefer to stick to the more tractable model
outlined here.5
4The assumption that productivity is owner-specic is a standard way in the theoretical literature on
M&A to assure the protability of mergers (e.g. Bjornvatn, 2004; Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002). It is
consistent with empirical observations for the U.S. that plant productivity increases after acquisitions by
more productive owners and decreases if the acquirers plants are less e¢ cient on average (Maksimovic
and Phillips, 2001). On the other hand, ruling out use of a targets variety eliminates incentives for the
most productive rm to take over all remaining rms. Such a situation would certainly be inconsistent
with empirical facts. It would also render meaningless any analysis of capital transfers via M&A in
response to external shocks.
5Internal investment could be introduced, for example, by allowing rms to employ labor from an
additional sector to produce new capital. Distinguishing a market for used capital from the M&A market
would be possible by introducing variable costs for adapting capital for sale (see Jovanovic and Rousseau,
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As said, I consider an initial steady state equilibrium in which no rm has an in-
centive to exit or enter the market or change its capital stock level. First consider the
determination of the optimal capital stock of active rms in this equilibrium. With
every unit of capital rms hold in addition to F , they can generate per-period rev-
enues of p' but face opportunity costs of i=(1   ) since they could also o¤er their
capital for sale on the M&A market. Since every rm is a monopolist for its variety,
it chooses a price-output combination that maximizes total discounted prots, given
by T (') =
pq
1   

q
'
+ F

i
1  . The optimal levels of prices and per-period out-
put are thus p(') = 
 1
i
'
and q(') =
h

 1
i
'
i 
P  1, requiring a capital stock of
kd(') =


 1i
 
' 1P  1 + F .
In addition to selling domestically, active rms can also export to the foreign market.
However, they incur variable iceberg-type trade cost in doing so, i.e. for every unit
they ship only 1= units arrive while the rest melts during transport. The corresponding
export price is thus px(') =  1
i
'
and per-period exports are qx(') =
h

 1
i
'
i 
P  1.
In addition to incurring the variable trade costs measured by  , exporters also have to
make a one-time capital investment of Fx in order to serve the foreign market. Thus,
total capital demand for export production is kx(') =


 1 i
 
' 1P  1 + Fx. Note
that the investment Fx is needed in addition to the domestic setup capital F and can
be thought of as adapting products to foreign standards, establishing local distribution
networks etc. (see Roberts and Tybout, 1997).
Given active rmsoptimal capital stocks, it remains to determine the set of active
rms. In each market, there is a large number (Me) of potential entrants. Firm pro-
ductivities are initially drawn at random from a cumulative distribution V (') but all
rms acquire knowledge about their productivity parameter ' before entry, i.e. before
acquiring the minimum capital amount F or any additional capital.6 Thus, only those
rms will produce for which the sum of discounted future operating prots given by
pq
1    q' i1  is at least equal to the setup costs Fi=(1   ). Similarly, only rms that
can cover the xed exporting cost Fxi=(1  ) through future exporting prots will enter
the export market. These two entry conditions can be used to obtain expressions for
the threshold productivities at which production for the domestic and foreign market
becomes protable (denoted ' and 'x, respectively). Appendix A.1 provides the corre-
sponding derivations and results but my interest here is on the resulting levels of capital
2002). These additional forms of adjustment would put upper and lower bounds on the M&A price but
would not eliminate resource transfers via M&A in reaction to trade liberalization.
6Introducing uncertainty of potential entrants about their future productivity levels combined with an
exogenous probability of rm death as in Melitz (2003) would allow generating continuous entry and exit
of rms and steady state M&A activity (in the sense that entrants with insu¢ cient productivity would
want to immediately resell their assets). However, the basic intuition of trade liberalization leading to
a reshu­ ing of resources to more productive rms can equally well be captured in the simpler model
presented here.
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demand for domestic and export production.
Demand for capital for domestic production (kd) comes from all rms with '  '
while rms with '  'x need additional capital (kx) to produce for the export market.
To obtain explicit solutions for ', 'x, kd, and kx, I choose a specic distributional
form for V ('). In line with other contributions in the heterogeneous rm literature (e.g.
Melitz and Ottaviano, 2005), I let ' be Pareto-distributed, i.e. with cumulative density
V (') = 1  


'
a
, where  > 0, a >    1 > 0, and '  . With these assumptions, I
can determine the market clearing price i=(1  ) and derive total capital stocks used for
exporting and domestic production (see appendix A.2 for details):
Kd =
Z 1
'='
kd (')Mev (') d' = K
"
1 +  a

Fx
F
 1 a
 1
# 1
(1)
and
Kx =
Z 1
'='x
kx (')Mev (') d' = K
"
1 + a

Fx
F
  1 a
 1
# 1
(2)
where  1 a
 1 < 0 since by assumption a >    1 > 0.
2.2 Bilateral Trade Liberalization
Now consider an unanticipated decline in variable trade costs  . Similar to Melitz (2003),
I focus on a comparison of the old and the new steady state equilibrium and in particular
on the changes in capital allocation between the two equilibria. It is clear from (1) and (2)
that the amount of capital used for domestic and export production will be di¤erent in the
new equilibrium, with Kx increasing and Kd decreasing. Intuitively, increased presence
of foreign exporters will lower revenues for local rms from production for the domestic
market, implying lower returns to a rms existing capital stock. Consequently, import
competing rms o¤er part of their capital stock for sale on the M&A market and any rm
with ' below the new entry threshold ' will use M&A to exit the market altogether.
While trade liberalization thus leads to an increase of supply in M&A capital, it also
increases capital demand for export production. This is since lower costs for accessing the
foreign market imply larger market shares for exporters who in turn demand additional
capital. Better access to foreign markets also lowers the minimum productivity level
required for protable exporting ('x), leading to an increase in the number of exporters.
Since the total capital stock per country is xed at K, any increase in export capital
demand is o¤set by an equal decrease in capital demand for domestic production. Thus,
the total amount of reallocation of capital into export production can be determined by
di¤erentiating either of expressions (1) or (2) with respect to  . Opting for (1), I obtain:
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dKd =
aK
[1 + ]2 
d > 0
where I dened  =  a
 
Fx
F
 1 a
 1 > 0 as an overall measure of initial trade costs.
The total amount of capital transfers is simply the absolute value of this derivative, i.e.
T = jdKdj. Since a, K,  and  are all positive, T can be written as:
T =
aK
[1 + ]2 
jd j (3)
That is, the amount of resource transfer via M&A is increasing in the magnitude of
trade liberalization (as captured by jd j).7 Also note that capital is channelled from
non-exporters to exporters. Since the presence of xed exporting costs means that only
the most productive among the active rms will export, the transfer of capital is in e¤ect
from less to more productive rms (see appendix A.1 for a formal derivation). Finally,
note that revenues (r) and per-period prots net of capital costs (that is, (1  )T ) are
increasing functions of productivity ' in this model. This implies that acquiring rms
are also larger (in terms of sales) and more protable than targets.
2.3 Extensions and Questions for the Empirical Analysis
Although the model just presented is highly stylized, its central intuition holds much
more generally: trade liberalization has asymmetric e¤ects across rms which in turn
necessitates a redistribution of resources via M&A. In the within-industry setting ana-
lyzed here, this leads to the prediction that decreases in bilateral trade barriers lead to a
transfer of resources from import-competing rms to new and existing exporters. While
a within-sector analysis will be part of the empirics, it is however useful to be aware of
whether and how the theoretical results would have to be modied in a more general
setting.
First, while the model assumes two symmetric trading partners, the U.S. market is
about ten times the size of the Canadian market. This suggests that trade liberalization
should have a much stronger e¤ect on M&A activity in Canada since increases in both
import competition and exporting opportunities will be substantially bigger there.8
7Note that interpreting the whole of T as M&A assumes that the export and domestic production
unit of a rm sell or acquire all of their capital through the M&A market. Alternatively, one could
assume that exporters reallocate capital internally from domestic to export production and acquire only
the shortfall on the M&A market. While this assumption considerably complicates the analysis, the
principal results on which I will rely for my empirical analysis will remain unchanged: M&A is increasing
in jd j and jd j enters the reallocation volume T multiplicatively (results available from author upon
request).
8This intuition can be formalized by extending the above model to asymmetric countries (requiring
a freely tradable numeraire good to x the price of capital and to allow the derivation of closed form
solutions). Results available from the author upon request.
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Second, extending the model to multiple sectors raises the possibility of diversifying or
conglomerate M&A transactions that go across industry boundaries. The basic intuition
of the model will still apply, however: rms want to acquire production capacity in other
industries through acquisitions both because of improved exporting opportunities there or
because increased import competition has made assets cheaper. Since the targets capital
is likely to be sector specic in the vast majority of cases, this argument also makes clear
that the relevant reductions in variable trade costs in such a multi-sector model are the
ones facing the acquisition target. This is because the acquirer will have to use the new
production capacity to produce the target industrys goods.9
Finally, acquisitions might also be cross-border in nature, e.g. expanding foreign
exporters may want to acquire import competing domestic rms. While the decrease
in the latter rms reservation price for their assets will encourage acquisitions, there
will also be a counterbalancing e¤ect for horizontal M&A arising from tari¤-jumping
considerations: decreases in variable trade costs make it easier to serve the foreign market
via exports and thus reduce the incentives to establish production capacity there via
acquisitions.10
The second key implication that arose from the theoretical model was that resource
transfers will be from less to more productive rms (since exporters are more productive
than non-exporters). Again, a similar prediction should hold for acquisitions across both
national and industry borders since M&A will only create value for the buyer if the
acquired assets can be put to a more protable use. The productivity advantage of the
acquiring rm and the ensuing selection into exporter status is what allows this increase
in protability in my model.
To summarize, the model and the above discussion suggest addressing the following
questions in the empirical analysis:
1. Do reductions in variable trade costs (tari¤ cuts) lead to more takeovers of rms
in the a¤ected sector? Is this e¤ect stronger in industries with larger tari¤ cuts (as
predicted by equation 3)?
2. Is the e¤ect similar for within- and cross-industry acquisitions? Is it similar for
domestic and cross-border transactions? Is there a stronger impact on the M&A
activity in the smaller Canadian market?
9An easy way of formalizing this intuition would be in a two sector model in which rms can use
production capacity in the other sector at their own productivity level ' but rst have to make an
investment I to acquire the necessary sector-specic production know-how (this would be addition to
F ). If the productivity of an acquirer from the non-liberalizing sector is high enough to be an exporter
in the liberalizing sector, a lowering of trade costs might raise its potential prots above the threshold I
and trigger entry.
10Both Bertrand and Zitouna (2005) and Bjornvatn (2004) formalize this trade-o¤ between declining
reservation prices of potential targets and better export access to the foreign market.
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3. Are acquirers more protable and more productive than targets? Again, does this
e¤ect vary across the di¤erent M&A categories (within- vs. between-industry and
domestic- vs. cross-border)?
Answers to these questions will shed light on the qualitative characteristics of M&A
as an adjustment mechanism in the face of trade liberalization. A further interesting
question that arises is whether resource transfers via M&A are also quantitatively impor-
tant. While the nature of my dataset does not allow a denitive answer to this question,
I will provide some evidence that the overall amount of transfers is indeed likely to be
large (section 7).
3 The Case of CUSFTA
The particular liberalization episode I will use for my empirical investigation is the
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreements (CUSFTA) of 1989. The idea of abol-
ishing trade barriers between Canada and the U.S. had been around for some time before
CUSFTA but strong opposition in Canada had led to the eventual failure of all prior
attempts at implementing free trade. Against this background and again against sub-
stantial political opposition, negotiations for CUSFTA started in May 1986, were nalized
in October 1987 and the treaty was signed in early 1988. The agreement came into e¤ect
on 1 January 1989 which was also the date of the rst round of tari¤ cuts. Tari¤s were
then phased out over a period of up to ten years with some industries eventually opting
for a swifter phase-out.
In terms of economic analysis, CUSFTA presents several advantages over other trade
liberalizations. First, the main instrument of liberalization - tari¤ cuts - is easily quan-
tiable and shows a large variation across sectors which allows for the implementation
of a di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimation strategy. Secondly, CUSFTA was a clearly de-
ned policy experiment in the sense that it was neither part of a larger packet of market
reforms nor was it introduced in response to a macroeconomic shock, two factors that
have made the identication of trade reform e¤ects extremely di¢ cult in other settings
(Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2001; Treer, 2004). In this sense, the reductions in tari¤ rates
triggered by CUSFTA can to a large extent be regarded as exogenous - indeed, Treer
(2004) performs formal statistical tests for a wide range of specications and dependent
variables but nds little evidence to the contrary.
In the context of studying the impact of trade liberalization on M&A, CUSFTA has
two additional advantages. First, it was largely unanticipated since its ratication by
the Canadian parliament was considered highly unlikely as late as November 1988.11
11See Morck et al. (1998) for a chronology of the events leading up to the eventual ratication of
CUSFTA. During the entire process, ratication was considered unlikely given both the prior history
11
The fact that its eventual implementation thus came very much as a surprise to all
participants considerably reduces concerns about anticipatory M&A activity and makes
the years before 1989 a suitable control period. In addition, CUSFTA was a liberalization
agreement between industrialized countries with developed nancial markets and few
restrictions on mergers and acquisitions, at least in comparison to most other developing
and developed countries. Indeed, although there exists, to my knowledge, no econometric
evidence to date, there is some anecdotal evidence that CUSFTA has led to an increase
in M&A activity (OECD, 2001). Given that a number of existing studies have shown
that there has also been a substantial impact on economic variables other than M&A
activity (e.g. Treer, 2004, on productivity and employment; or Head and Ries, 1999, on
plant scale and number of plants), it does thus not seem unreasonable a priori to expect
an e¤ect of CUSFTA on the acquisition behavior of rms.
4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
In line with existing studies, my empirical analysis of CUSFTAs impact on M&A activity
focuses on the manufacturing sector which still represents the bulk of tradable goods in an
economy and is thus the sector most directly a¤ected by trade liberalization. The time
frame for my analysis is 1985-1997, the period for which I have data on tari¤s, M&A
activity and rm-level characteristics of targets and acquirers.
Tari¤s and M&A Activity. I use annual three-digit U.S. and Canadian tari¤data
(140 industries) as my measure of the extent of trade liberalization.12 While CUSFTA also
included provisions on non-tari¤ barriers, reductions of tari¤s were the main instrument
of liberalization. As has been pointed out among others by Treer (2004) and Topalova
(2004), tari¤ cuts also have the advantage of being a direct policy instrument and are as
such less susceptible to endogeneity problems. This is in contrast to other more indirect
measures like import penetration rates which are the result of a complex interaction
process with a large number of additional factors.13
of failed ratications of already negotiated free trade agreements with the U.S. and the strength of the
opposition to CUSFTA. Indeed, John Turner, the opposition leader and a strong opponent of free trade
with the U.S., publicly vowed as late as October 1988 that he would dismantle CUSFTA in case of victory
in national elections scheduled for November 1988. Since his Liberal Party had a lead of at least 10% in
opinion polls until right before the election, ratication did indeed seem unlikely. However, against all
odds, the Canadian Conservative Party emerged as the surprise election winner and the government was
returned with a parliamentary majority su¢ cient to ratify CUSFTA.
12The data are the same as those described in Head and Ries (1999). I would like to thank Keith Head
for making them available to me. Appendix B provides some additional details on their construction.
13Compare footnote 2 and Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) for a more general discussion of the pitfalls of
various other indirect measures. Of course, tari¤ rates are at the discretion of policy makers and as such
subject to di¤erent endogeneity problems. However, as argued in the previous section, such concerns
have less weight in the case of CUSFTA where tari¤ cuts were unexpected and largely exogenous (at
least once one controls for the variation in initial tari¤ levels - as I will do by using industry xed e¤ect,
see below).
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Data on M&A activity in the manufacturing sector comes from Thomson Financials
Worldwide M&A database. The principal sources of information used by Thomson are
over 200 English and foreign language news sources, SEC lings and their international
counterparts, trade publications and proprietary surveys of investment banks, law rms
and other advisors. The database includes all corporate transactions involving at least
5% ownership of a company and a transaction value of one million USD or more or where
the value of the transaction is undisclosed. In line with the discussion in the previous
sections, I use all M&A deals involving acquisitions of U.S. or Canadian manufacturing
targets by other U.S. or Canadian rms, yielding approximately 23,500 transactions in the
period under study (1985-1997). I dene M&Abroadly to include sales of individual
business segments and divisions as well as of entire companies. This is consistent with
the idea from the theoretical model that M&A can both be a form of contraction and
total rm exit. I further consider acquisitions of both majority and minority interests
since there is strong evidence that signicant inuence for the acquirer is already given at
participation rates well below 50%.14 Transactions are classied into three-digit industries
and matched with the tari¤ data according to the primary activity of the target company
or the acquired business segment (see appendix B for details). For the purpose of this
study, I will use the number of mergers and acquisitions in a given period as my principal
indicator for M&A activity. Using numbers rather then aggregate deal volumes has two
principal advantages. First, it is the much more readily available indicator since for the
majority of deals, transaction values are not published (this is the case for 55% of deals
in my dataset). Second, value measures are extremely sensitive to the treatment of very
large deals which often make up signicant proportions of the total deal volume despite
representing only a few out of several thousand transactions every year. In my sample,
for instance, the three biggest deals on average make up about 20% of the aggregate
deal volume in a given year. Within three-digit industries (the aggregation level of my
empirical analysis), the biggest transaction alone accounts on average for over 30% of the
entire industry volume during 1985-1997.15
Tables 1 and 2 provide some descriptive statistics on M&A activity and manufacturing
14Morck et al. (1998) cite evidence that the threshold for e¤ective control lies on average at about 20%
in the U.S. Similarly, the Canadian Competition Bureau (2002) considers all acquisitions of more than
10% of control rights as potentially anti-competitive, with the corresponding gure for the U.S. being
15% (Brealey and Myers, 2000, chapter 33). In any case, minority acquisitions comprise only about 12%
of transactions in my sample. See section 5 for robustness checks excluding this category.
15Robustness checks using value data despite these problems yield qualitatively similar results for
domestic Canadian M&A activity as the count data estimates presented below (a "raw" regression
with neither imputation of missing transaction values nor deletion of outliers yields an estimated per-
percentage point e¤ect of tari¤ cuts on M&A activity of 14.6% - compared to 8.3% for the count results).
For domestic U.S. transactions, these raw regressions yield a negative coe¢ cient on tari¤ cuts but this
can be linked to just two to three massive outliers (in particular, the 20 billion USD acquisition of RJR
Nabisco by Kohlberg, Kravis and Roberts in 1988). In any case, the qualitative picture that will emerge
later on - a strong impact of CUSFTA on domestic Canadian M&A activity and a mostly insignicant
one on the U.S. and cross-border categories - stays intact in these value regressions.
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tari¤s in North America over the period 1985-1997. I start with an analysis of target
rms. The rst four columns of table 1 show the number of M&A transactions in the
U.S. and Canada at the two-digit level of the U.S. Industrial Classication of 1987.
As seen, domestic M&A activity (columns 1 and 4) is more common than cross-border
transactions (columns 2 and 3), even for the smaller Canadian market. Looking across
industries, it becomes apparent that there is substantial variation in the number of deals.
One simple reason for this is probably that di¤erent industries have very di¤erent numbers
of rms and establishments and thus more or less potential for takeovers. Sectors
with more players usually also have lower concentration ratios and face less scrutiny by
antitrust authorities. Columns 5-6 which list the average number of establishments per
industry conrm these conjectures: industries with more establishments have more M&A
activity - the correlation coe¢ cient between the number of establishments and total M&A
transactions is +52% for the U.S. and +55% for Canada.16 More subtly, there also seems
to be a connection between M&A activity and initial tari¤ rates (columns 7-8): industries
with higher import tari¤s in 1988 also experience less takeovers during the entire period
1985-1997 (the correlation coe¢ cient is -32% for the U.S. and -48% for Canada). This
seems in part to be a direct consequence of the relation between M&A activity and the
number of establishments: highly protected industries are usually industries in decline
which already have experienced shakeouts and have relatively few remaining players.
The next question is who the buyers of U.S. and Canadian manufacturing rms are.
Table 2 provides some information on this by listing the principal eld of activity of
acquiring rms. As the gures show, roughly 70% of acquirers are also manufacturing
rms, both in the U.S. and in Canada. Moreover, about 35% of transactions occur within
the same three-digit sector and another 13% within the same two-digit sector, so that
within-industry reallocation via M&A seems to be an important phenomenon. Around
17% of acquirers of U.S.-rms (21% for Canada) have their principal eld of activity
outside manufacturing (SIC-codes 2-3), although this gure probably overestimates the
incidence of diversifying or conglomerate M&A. This is since about one quarter of non-
manufacturing acquirers actually possess secondary elds of activity in manufacturing,
with the gure being as high as 50% in some categories (see columns 3 and 7).17
The second to last line of table 2 lists a category of acquirers that deserves special
attention. The group Investors, n.e.c.(SIC 6799) represents an amalgamation of dif-
16The sources for the number of establishments are the U.S. Census Bureau and Statistics Canada. I
use the number of establishments rather than the number of rms since my denition of M&A includes
both acquisition of entire rms and of individual subdivisions and possibly plants.
17Looking at secondary elds of activity also increases the numbers of transactions that are potentially
of within-industry nature. Columns 4 and 8 show the fraction of acquirers that have at least one
manufacturing 3-digit SIC code that matches the primary or any secondary manufacturing SIC code of
the target. If one counts all these transactions as intra-industry, the share of this reallocation type rises
to 40% which represents only a modest increase of about 5%-points. Since this is clearly an upper bound,
classication according to primary elds of activity seems to be a good approximation in determining
the within- or between-industry nature of M&A.
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ferent types of acquirers that are not easily classiable elsewhere. The main subgroups
of SIC 6799 are private equity and venture capital rms, investor groups, and individ-
ual investors. In all cases, it seems likely that acquisition by these groups represents a
signicant reallocation of resources in the sense that targets will be exposed to substan-
tial changes in management practices, restructuring etc. Also, among investor groups,
alliances of di¤erent manufacturing rms are not uncommon so that part of SIC 6799 are
indeed within-manufacturing acquisitions. For these reasons, I keep transactions involv-
ing SIC 6799 as part of my sample though I will present robustness checks excluding this
category.
Target and Acquirer Characteristics. For the comparison of target and acquirer
characteristics in section 6, I match the transaction parties from the Thomson M&A
database to Compustat North America and Compustat Global using the CNUM-identier
common to both datasets. Thomson Financial itself also provides nancial data on a
small number of targets and acquirers which I use to complement the information from
Compustat. My indicators of rm performance will be net sales, pre-tax income, the
number of employees, net capital stocks, and productivity and protability measures
based on these variables.18 The four indicators net sales, income, employees and net
capital stocks are available for between 7,500 to 12,500 out of the 47,000 company-year
combinations in my data (some companies are involved in several transactions in the
sample period).
The use of Compustat implies that my sample for comparing target and acquirer
characteristics consists mainly of publicly traded rms (although about 5% of rms are
privately held). I believe that this does not pose major problems for the analysis. First,
publicly traded rms make up a substantial fraction of the full sample of transaction
parties used to analyze changes in M&A activity (about 35%, with private companies
and rm subsidiaries making up the remaining 65% in the Thomson M&A database).
Second, as I will show in the next section, the impact of CUSFTA on publicly traded
rms was if anything slightly stronger than for the full sample of rms. Third, although
the number of publicly traded rms is small relative to the overall number of companies
in Canada and the U.S., their overall share of output and employment is above 80%.19
Thus, even if target-acquirer di¤erences for non-publicly traded rms were very di¤erent,
the ndings presented in section 6 would still have strong economic relevance.
18The exact sources for Compustat North America are data items 12 and 117 (net sales), 122 and
170 (pretax income), 29 and 146 (employees), and 8 and 141 ("net property, plants and equipment",
used as proxy for net capital stocks). For Compustat Global, data are contained in items 1 (net sales),
21 (pretax income), 162 (employees), and 76 ("net tangible xed assets", used as proxy for net capital
stocks). I use 4-digit sectoral deators to convert nominal values to 1987 values. I then convert entries
in Canadian dollars to US dollars by using the exchange rate for the base year 1987.
19This gure is based on a comparison of aggregate production and employment in Compustat North
America and Compustat Global with comparable data from the UNIDO database.
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Quantitative Importance of M&A: For the comparison of the amount of rm-
level resource transfers via M&A, contraction and exit (section 7), I will again rely on in-
formation for publicly traded rms from Compustat Global and Compustat North Amer-
ica. In addition to data on output (net sales) and employment, I use information on the
reason for deletion of companies from the Compustat les.20 I include all manufactur-
ing rms listed as active in either Compustat North America or Compustat Global at
some point during the period 1985-1997. After dropping some smaller Canadian rms
for which no exit information is available, this yields a sample of 331 Canadian and 5827
U.S. rms which again represent over 80% of manufacturing output and employment in
North America.
5 Trade Liberalization and M&A
5.1 A First Look at the Figures
How has M&A activity in North America evolved over time and what was the impact of
CUSFTA? Figure 1) plots the number of yearly manufacturing M&A transactions over
the period 1985-1997 for four di¤erent categories, all expressed as indices relative to 1988:
domestic U.S. transactions, domestic Canadian transactions, acquisitions of U.S. rms
by Canadian rms and acquisitions of Canadian rms by U.S. rms. The graphs also
indicate the start date of CUSFTA (1 January 1989) by a vertical line and have linear
splines tted to the data points pre- and post CUSFTA.
The gures do not reveal any clear e¤ect for both U.S. domestic activity and Canada-
U.S. takeovers. Takeovers of Canadian rms, however, both by other Canadian and
U.S. rms, show a marked increase in 1989, the rst year after the implementation of
CUSFTA. At the same time, all graphs display a general strong upward trend in the
number of M&A deals over the entire period. This provides some rst evidence on the
problems of descriptive studies that comment on M&A activity in the wake of CUSFTA
(such as OECD, 2001): the strong increases in transactions in the 1990s might simply
reect an underlying long-run trend. The before-after comparisons undertaken here do
not have this problem although it could still be that changes around 1989 were due to
other economy-wide factors contemporaneous to the rst round of tari¤cuts (for example,
CUSFTA also contained a general liberalization agreement on cross-border capital ows).
To provide stronger evidence that the observed changes in M&A activity are indeed
due to the tari¤ cuts implemented through CUSFTA, I thus split transactions within
each of the four categories into two groups (gure 2). Those from the 50% of target
20The relevant Compustat North America data items are 12 and 117 (net sales) and 29 and 146
(employees). Date and reason for deletion are provided in data footnotes AFTNT33-AFTNT35. For
Compustat Global, sales and employee data are contained in items 1 and 162, and reason and date of
deletion in the variables INCO and INCOD.
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industries that faced the steepest tari¤ cuts and those from the remaining 50%. I choose
tari¤s levied by the targets country for this classication. In practice, U.S. and Canadian
tari¤ cuts are very highly correlated so that results are similar when using the other tari¤
measure. From these gures, a slightly di¤erent picture emerges. For the two domestic
categories, the index of M&A activity is very similar across the two groups in the pre-
CUSFTA period. From 1989 onwards, however, M&A activity in Canada increases by
substantially more in the most a¤ected group. For the U.S., there is also a slightly more
pronounced increase for this group although the di¤erence to the least a¤ected group is
much smaller than in Canada. It thus seems that the impression from the initial graphs
holds up to this di¤erence-in-di¤erences analysis. M&A activity in Canada rose sharply
after 1989 and the magnitude of this increase seems to be related to the extent of tari¤
cuts across sectors. The impact on the U.S. is much smaller, consistent with the notion
that the liberalization shock was substantially bigger in Canada which integrated with a
market ten times her own size.
Turning to the cross-border categories (the two right hand side panels), the graphs
show slightly more volatility than in domestic M&A activity, reecting in part the smaller
number of transactions across the U.S.-Canadian border. Still, it seems that e¤ects
on cross-border M&A went in opposite directions. While Canadian acquisition activity
in the U.S. shows a slightly stronger increase in the group of most a¤ected industries,
the opposite holds true for takeovers of Canadian by U.S. rms. This last nding is
consistent with tari¤-jumping motives as an additional determinant for horizontal cross-
border M&A transactions. That is, in industries with stronger Canadian tari¤ cuts, U.S.
rms were less dependent on acquiring local production capacity to serve the Canadian
market. Increasing returns to scale may have reinforced this trend by inducing U.S. rms
to concentrate production in their larger domestic market. Such a home-market-type
e¤ect may also explain the stronger increases in Canadian acquisitions in the U.S. in the
most-a¤ected group, which took place despite easier export access to this market.21
5.2 Econometric Specication and Baseline Results
This section evaluates whether the impressions from the graphs of the last section carry
over to a formal econometric analysis. Among other things, the results obtained so far
have drawn attention to two potential pitfalls such an analysis faces. First, M&A activity
shows strong inter-industry variation and is negatively related to initial tari¤ levels (see
section 4). Since all tari¤s were eventually eliminated under CUSFTA, higher initial levels
also meant stronger subsequent cuts, implying a potentially spurious correlation of tari¤
21An often cited example that ts these explanations is the earlier North American Autopact of 1964
which liberalized automotive trade between Canada and the U.S.: no longer facing prohibitive tari¤s,
U.S. rms were able to concentrate production in their larger home market and serve the Canadian
market through exports rather than through local production.
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changes and M&A activity. Second, the strong increase in the number of mergers and
acquisitions over the whole period 1985-1997 suggests the presence of a general economy-
wide trend in M&A activity. Since all tari¤s came down after 1989 this could again lead
to a spurious correlation with tari¤ cuts. To address these issues, I will implement a
di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach by controlling for both industry and time xed e¤ects.
To obtain guidance on the choice of an appropriate econometric specication, I turn
to the theoretical model derived earlier. There, the volume of capital reallocation was
given by T = aK
[1+]2
jd j (equation 3), where jd j was the absolute change in variable
trade costs, K an economys capital stock,  a measure of initial trade costs (both xed
and variable), and a > 0 the Pareto-distributions shape parameter.
First consider the choice of empirical proxies for jd j and T . In the model, variable
trade costs  are of the iceberg-type and thus relate to tari¤s t as  = 1+ t which implies
d = dt. My measure for jd j = jdtj will thus be the absolute change in tari¤s from the
pre-CUSFTA year of 1988 to the last year for which I have tari¤data (1997). As dt  0 for
all sectors, this absolute change is jdtj =  dt =tari¤1988-tari¤1997. Because CUSFTA was
a bilateral liberalization agreement and the treaty partners tended to protect the same
sectors, the magnitude of U.S. and Canadian tari¤ cuts is very similar across industries.
In line with previous empirical studies of trade liberalizations - which mostly look at
unilateral tari¤ reductions by a particular country - I opt for domestic tari¤s. That is, I
use Canadian tari¤ cuts when analyzing the impact of CUSFTA on takeovers of Canadian
rms and U.S. tari¤s cuts for transactions involving U.S. targets.22 As already mentioned,
my proxy for the amount of reallocation via M&A (T ) is the number of transactions which
I denote MA. In order to smooth the data and reduce the number of zero observations,
I aggregate numbers over the pre- and post CUSFTA-period (1985-1988 and 1989-1997).
This yields a panel with two time periods and 140 industries. With these choices of
proxies for jd j and T , I can write my specication as:
MA =
aK
[1 + ]2 
jdtj (4)
Given the multiplicative form of (4), one possibility would be log-linearization and estima-
tion via OLS. However since the occurrence of zeros in MA is still frequent, in particular
for the cross-border merger categories, such an approach is not feasible. Also note that
MA is a non-negative and usually small integer, suggesting that count data models are
a more appropriate choice here. To obtain a corresponding specication, I rewrite the
right-hand side of (4) in exponential form:
22Robustness checks using foreign tari¤ reductions as regressors yielded similar results which is un-
surprising given the very high correlation of tari¤ cuts (in excess of 80%). An interesting area for
future work would be to study more asymmetric liberalization agreements with su¢ cient independent
variation in tari¤ cuts. Such agreements would allow to separately identify the e¤ects of import- and
export-promoting policies on M&A activity.
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MA = exp(ln a+ lnK + ln

[1 + ]2 
+ ln jdtj) (5)
The identifying assumption I will initially make (but later relax) is that the various
components of (5) besides jdtj are either time- or industry invariant and can thus be
captured by time- and industry xed e¤ects, di, dpre and dpost (where dpre and dpost
denote the pre- and post CUSFTA period, respectively).23 Writing (5) in expectations
form and using the dummy variables just dened then yields a conditional mean exactly
identical to the one found in xed e¤ect count data models:24
E(MAitjdt; di; dt) = it = exp(di + dpre + dpost +   dpost ln jdtjit) (6)
Consistent estimates of the parameters in (6) can be easily obtained via xed e¤ects
Poisson estimation. I opt for Poisson rather than a negative binomial model since the
former has the desirable robustness property that consistency of estimates will be achieved
as long as the conditional mean (6) is correctly specied - irrespective of whether MAit
actually follows a Poisson distribution (see Wooldridge, 1999 and 2002; Santos Silva
and Tenreyro, 2004). Standard errors will be a¤ected by deviations from the Poisson
assumption but computation of variance-covariance matrices robust to overdispersion,
heteroskedasticity and within-group correlation is straightforward (Wooldridge, 1999 and
2002).
Table 3 reports results for my baseline Poisson xed e¤ects model (6) for the full sam-
ple of acquirers, i.e. manufacturing rms from the same three-digit sector as the target,
manufacturing rms from other sectors and rms with principal activities outside manu-
facturing. Line 1 shows coe¢ cient estimates of  and dpost for each of the four subgroups
of M&A (domestic and cross-border transactions).25 As seen, the strongest impact of
CUSFTA seems to be on domestic Canadian M&A activity which is consistent with the
earlier graphical analysis. As an approximation, the coe¢ cient estimates suggests that
23Since the parameter a, initial trade barriers , and countriescapital stocks K are all constant in the
model, this identifying assumption is consistent with the earlier theory. Obviously, various industry-level
shocks might cause time-industry-variation in a or K, a point which I discuss in more detail below and
try to control for.
24Note that the below specication implicitly sets tari¤ cuts in 1985-1988 to zero. This is necessary
since my data sources do not contain US tari¤s for 1985 and 1986 and only imputed data for Canada (see
appendix B). However, as shown for example in Gu et al. (2003) and also evident in my Canadian tari¤
data, tari¤ changes in 1985-1988 were very small both in absolute terms and compared to the subsequent
cuts. Thus, assuming a zero-change seems to be a good approximation (also see appendix B for a brief
discussion of the very similar results obtained by using the imputed Canadian data).
25dpre is the excluded category so that dpost gives the average relative increase of M&A activity in
comparison to the pre-CUSFTA period that is not explained by tari¤ cuts. Note that contrary to
what is sometimes asserted in the literature, there is no incidental parameter problem with the xed
e¤ects Poisson regressions (see Cameron and Trivedi (1998) for a proof). That is, conditional maximum
likelihood estimation (using total industry transactionsMAi =
P
tMAit as the su¢ cient statistic) yields
identical results to simple QML Poisson estimation with a set of industry dummies.
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each doubling of tari¤ cuts in a given target industry led to an increase of 36.5% in the
number of domestic Canadian M&A transactions. Results are also signicantly positive
for U.S. domestic M&A activity, although the magnitude of the coe¢ cient estimate is
only about 1/5 of its Canadian counterpart.
Lines 2-3 of table 3 show results for two alternative measures of tari¤ cuts. The rst
measure uses absolute changes in tari¤s, i.e. dpost  (tari¤1988 tari¤1997) rather than
dpost log(tari¤1988 tari¤1997). This gives equal weight to each percentage point of tari¤
cuts, irrespective of the overall magnitude of the reduction. The second measure is a
binary indicator taking the value one if an industry is among the 50% of industries with
the highest tari¤ cuts, i.e. dpost  1(dt > dt50%). This measure is thus similar to the one
used in the graphic analysis from the last section. The results from these two alternative
measures show a qualitatively similar picture to the baseline estimates for domestic M&A
activity, i.e. the impact on Canada seems to have been much stronger.26 The coe¢ cient
estimates for the absolute change in tari¤s - which is the most straightforward of all
measures in terms of interpretation - indicate that for every percentage point decrease in
tari¤s the number of takeovers of rms in the a¤ected industries increased on average by
8.3%. Given that the mean decline in Canadian tari¤s at the three-digit level was about
8%, this suggests that CUSFTA increased M&A activity by approximately 65%. The
corresponding coe¢ cient for the U.S. is much lower (0.98) but still marginally statistically
signicant. This again highlights the di¤erential impact of CUSFTA on the two markets,
in particular if one takes into account that the mean U.S. tari¤ decline was only about
4% (yielding an estimated average impact on M&A activity of just 4%). Taking into
account all three tari¤ cut measures, the picture is less clear for the cross-border merger
categories since coe¢ cients are mostly statistically insignicant. Qualitatively, however,
the estimates give a similar impression as the earlier graphs: Canadian acquisitions in
the U.S. have gone up as a result of tari¤ cuts while U.S. acquisitions in Canada have
come down.
5.3 Robustness Checks
Control Variables I have so far relied on the assumption that tari¤ cuts were the
only time- and industry-varying determinants of M&A activity, which allowed me to
identify the e¤ect of CUSFTA from a simple di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach without
additional controls. While M&A activity will in practice also be inuenced by other
time-industry varying factors, one has to proceed carefully when choosing appropriate
control variables. First, I will refrain from using a number of obvious industry-level
26Note that according to standard model selection criteria for maximum likelihood models (e.g. pseudo-
R2s) the theory-based based measure (log tari¤ changes) actually provides a marginally better t than the
two adhoc-measures. For the three baseline specications estimated here, the results for the pseudo-R2s
are: 0.87 (log changes), 0.86 (absolute changes), and 0.85 (binary measure).
20
variables like employment, output, the number of rms or productivity growth. Besides
likely endogeneity problems, the common concern with these variables is that there is
ample evidence that they are themselves strongly inuenced by trade liberalization (for
the e¤ects of CUSFTA see in particular Treer, 2004, and Head and Ries, 1999). Since
it is indeed through their inuence on such variables that tari¤ cuts change incentives
for M&A, controlling for them would invalidly attribute less of the increase in takeover
activity to freer trade. A similar criticism applies to a number of determinants that
have been proposed in the Corporate Finance literature on M&A activity, like capacity
utilization, sales growth, free cash ow or relative price-earnings ratios (Mitchell and
Mulherin, 1996; Mulherin and Boone, 2000; Andrade and Sta¤ord, 2004; Gugler et al.,
2004). In addition, some of these variables are of an inherently rm-level nature and thus
unsuited for the present industry-level analysis.27
In the light of these di¢ culties, I choose to pursue a di¤erent route and try to control
for time- and industry-varying factors other than tari¤ cuts by including the number
of takeovers of rms in the same industry in the United Kingdom, France and (West)
Germany.28 The idea behind this approach is that these countries were largely una¤ected
by CUSFTA and changes in takeover activity there should thus pick up any general
industry-level trends in underlying M&A determinants. Since many factors which might
potentially inuence takeover rates are highly correlated across developed countries, these
trends are likely to be similar in Europe and in North America. Examples include oil price
shocks, low sales growth and low capacity utilization combined with large amounts of free
cash ow in declining industries, or strongly increasing price-earnings ratios in times of
stock market bubbles. Indeed, the simple correlation between the number of European
and U.S. or Canadian M&A transactions per-period and industry is on average about
70%. Note that I exclude any acquisitions of North American rms in Europe or vice
versa from the EU numbers. This avoids endogeneity problems arising from the fact that
M&A transactions in North America could be a substitute for cross-Atlantic transactions
in some cases.29
Lines 4-6 of table 3 show the results for all three tari¤ cut measures with the controls
in place. I use domestic M&A in the UK, France and Germany as the control for the
27Variables of this type analyzed in the literature are Tobins q, free cash ow, and price-earnings
ratios. As discussed for example by Andrade and Sta¤ord (2004), there is no straightforward way to
aggregate these determinants from the rm to the industry level since their impact is highly non-linear
or depends on di¤erences between targets and acquirers.
28These are the three developed countries besides Canada and the U.S. for which M&A coverage in
Thomson Financial is reasonably complete back to 1985.
29A remaining issue might arise from the implementation of the European Common Market during
the period 1986-1992. However, the impact on M&A activity through changes in manufacturing trade
is likely to have been small. This is since much more substantial measures like duty-free trade, common
external tari¤s and many common sectoral policies had already been in place for more than a decade by
1986. A more novel aspect of the common market was the liberalization of cross-border capital ows.
This measure, however, showed little cross-sectoral variation and should as such be captured by my
period xed e¤ects.
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two regressions on domestic M&A activity and all cross-border M&A with targets in
one of these three countries as the control for the cross-border categories (excluding
acquisitions by U.S. or Canadian rms). As seen, the coe¢ cients estimates are very
similar to the earlier results, consistent with the idea that industry and time xed e¤ects
already captured most of the inuence of non-tari¤ related determinants of M&A activity.
Results for Di¤erent Subsamples I perform further robustness checks by looking
at specic subsamples of M&A transactions. I start by excluding the acquirer SIC-code
6799 (Investors, n.e.c.). As discussed earlier, a large fraction of this category is made
up by private equity and venture capital rms as well as private investors, groups which
do not neatly t into the earlier theoretical framework. However, results are basically
una¤ected by the exclusion of this group as is shown in the rst three lines of table 4.
Next, I drop acquisitions of minority interests from my sample, i.e. transactions at
the end of which the acquirer holds less than 50% of control rights or held more than
50% to begin with. The corresponding coe¢ cient estimates (lines 4-6) show a slightly
stronger impact of tari¤ cuts on domestic Canadian M&A activity while estimates for
domestic U.S. transactions drop somewhat and are now mostly statistically insignicant
(except for the binary tari¤ cut measure).
In lines 7-9, I look at M&A transactions taking place within identical three-digit
manufacturing industries. These specications are thus closest to the theoretical model
presented in section 2 which looked at within-sector acquisitions. From the regression
results it appears that CUSFTA a¤ected within-sector M&A activity in broadly similar
ways to overall M&A activity. The one noticeable exception is a strong increase in the
coe¢ cient magnitude for U.S.-by-Canada-acquisitions when absolute tari¤ changes are
used as a regressor (although this change is not repeated for the other functional forms).
Finally, I restrict my sample to include only transactions involving publicly traded
rms. This is of interest since the following sections, which look at target and acquirer
characteristics and the quantitative importance of M&A as a form of reallocation, will
almost exclusively rely on data for publicly traded rms. It is thus useful to check whether
the qualitative results found so far also apply to this particular subsample of rms. In
addition, publicly traded rms tend to be bigger and are more likely to be exporters which
suggests that CUSFTAs impact may indeed have been di¤erent for this group. However,
lines 10-12 of table 4 show that this is not the case for domestic M&A activity. The
cross-border M&A regressions, in contrast, do show somewhat stronger results for this
subsample. U.S. acquisitions by Canadian rms seem to be more a¤ected by CUSFTA
now, with coe¢ cients mostly being signicant and large in absolute magnitude. Also, U.S.
acquisitions in Canada are positively related to tari¤cuts in this subsample although none
of the estimates are statistically signicant.
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Changes in Competition Policy as an Alternative Explanation? As the above
graphs and estimations make clear, the main reaction from CUSFTA seems to have come
from domestic Canadian M&A activity. This brings up an alternative explanation for
the results found so far. Canadian competition authorities might have become more
lenient vis-à-vis domestic M&A activity given increased competition from U.S. rms.
If this relaxation of supervision was correlated with the extent of Canadian tari¤ cuts
(e.g. because the competition authorities took them into account in their denition
of the relevant market), this could provide an alternative explanation for my results.
Note, however, that such a policy change is not incompatible with M&A as a means
of resource transfer: the need for industrial restructuring after CUSFTA could have
been the underlying cause for increased M&A activity and a more lenient stance from
the competition authorities may have merely facilitated the adjustment. One would
thus need the additional argument that Canadian industries were already poised for
consolidation before CUSFTA and that relaxation of merger guidelines then eliminated
restraining regulatory barriers. While it is di¢ cult to denitely exclude this possibility,
documents and statements published by the Canadian Competition Bureau do not show
any support for this hypothesis.30 Also, if a looser competition policy was responsible for
the surge in M&A activity one would expect to see a far stronger e¤ect for within-industry
transactions which is not the case.31
6 Comparison of Acquirers and Targets
The last sections have provided evidence that CUSFTA led to an increase in M&A activ-
ity, in particular in Canada and both within and between industries. This section looks in
more detail at the characteristics of acquirers and targets in order to determine whether
the resulting inter-rm transfer of resources is similar in nature to the one involved in
rm and establishment exit and contraction. The existing literature has shown that it is
usually the less productive rms and plants that contract or exit. While it is typically not
possible to track the employment of factors of production in these studies, the parallel
expansion of high productivity establishments seems to indicate that they re-employ at
least part of the freed-up resources. The question thus arises whether M&A similarly
leads to a channeling of resources towards more productive owners. This also has im-
portant implications for M&A-induced changes in aggregate productivity since existing
studies have demonstrated that post-takeover gains in the targets productivity depend
crucially on a superior e¢ ciency of the acquiring rm (e.g. Maksimovic and Phillips,
30See http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/ and in particular the revised Merger Enforcement Guide-
linesfrom 1991.
31A bigger increase would be expected for this category since horizontal M&A is the main focus
of the competition authorities. According to the Canadian Competition Bureau (1991) vertical and
conglomerate M&A transactions were rarely the object of regulatory restrictions.
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2001).
A simple way of comparing targets and acquirers is to regress proxies for rm perfor-
mance on dummies for whether a company is a target or an acquirer in a transaction.
For this, I use data from Compustat North America and Compustat Global as described
in section 4. I start by looking at net sales and the number of employees to get an
impression of the size di¤erences between targets and acquirers. Next, I compare levels
of protability, using pretax income per employee and pretax income per net sales as
proxies. Recall from the theoretical section of this paper that more productive rms were
predicted to be both larger and more protable than less productive rms. Thus the
above comparisons might also be seen as a rst check on underlying productivity di¤er-
ences. Since in practice, di¤erences in size and protability might also be due to other
factors, I additionally use labor and total factor productivity as more direct proxies.32
The basic econometric specication I estimate is:
ytj = + dt + 1  targettj + "tj (7)
where ytj is the performance indicator of interest for company j at time t (where t denotes
the last completed scal year prior to the takeover announcement). The dt represent time
xed e¤ects and targettj is a dummy that takes the value one if the company in question
is a target.33 The coe¢ cient of interest is thus 1 which gives the di¤erence between
targets and acquirers (which are the omitted category). Block 1 of table 5 shows results
for these baseline regressions. Acquirers are found to be signicantly bigger in terms
of net sales and the number of employees (columns 1 and 2). In addition, both pretax
income measures indicate that acquirers are also substantially more protable (columns
3 and 4). Interestingly, using estimates of , dt and 1 for these specications, one nds
for most years of the sample that targets were on average making slight losses prior to
takeover. Finally, the productivity di¤erences between acquirers and targets are also
signicantly positive. For labor productivity, the acquirersadvantage is somewhat more
pronounced than for total factor productivity (12% as opposed to 4%) which seems to be
32My TFP gures are calculated from a two-factor Cobb-Douglas production function under the as-
sumption of constant returns to scale (the two factors are labor and capital and I assume an elasticity
of value added with respect to labor of 0:66). Note that since Compustat does not provide information
on intermediate inputs, I use output (net sales) as my proxy for value added and assume that variations
in the intermediate share are not systematically related to target or acquirer status.
33Note that specication (7) pools all available data for targets and acquirers rather than calculating
a target-acquirer di¤erence for each merger and estimating the mean di¤erence. This is necessary since
for most mergers I do not have nancial data on both parties. Note that for a given sample of mergers
without missing data these two approaches are identical. Also, while pooling data increases the number
of acquirers relative to targets (because data availability is generally better for larger rms and acquirers
tend to be larger), the resulting bias is likely to work against and not in favor of nding signicant
di¤erences. This is since it is the smaller targets that get excluded from the sample (and since - at
least in my sample - smaller size in terms of either net sales or employment is associated with lower
protability and productivity).
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due to a higher capital intensity among acquirers.
My baseline estimate of 1 is an average across all four M&A categories, i.e. U.S. and
Canadian domestic transactions and the two cross-border categories. Next, I allow for
acquirer-target di¤erences to vary across these groups by estimating separate intercepts
and slopes for all four types of M&A transactions:
ytj = CAT + dt+ 1 tarUUtj + 2 tarCCtj + 3 tarUCtj + 4 tarCUtj + "tj (8)
where CAT are the category specic intercepts and tarUUtj, tarCCtj, tarUCtj, and
tarCUtj are binary variables indicating whether a company is a target in one of the four
types of transactions (for example, tarUCtj equals one if company j is the U.S. target
of a Canadian acquirer). Results on the four target dummy coe¢ cients are shown in
block 2 of table 5. Target-acquirer di¤erences for the non-productivity indicators (net
sales, employees and the two pretax income measures) are qualitatively similar to the
rst specication. However, the productivity estimates reveal some interesting changes.
First, di¤erences in both labor and total factor productivity seem to be considerably
more pronounced for domestic Canadian M&A transactions (acquirers are about 17%
and 13% more productive, respectively). For domestic U.S. transactions, the productiv-
ity advantage of acquirers is somewhat lower (12% for labor productivity and 3.7% for
TFP) but still highly signicant. Third, estimates for acquisitions made by U.S rms in
Canada also show acquirers to be more productive than targets, in particular with respect
to total factor productivity. In contrast, the productivity di¤erences for Canadian-U.S.
acquisitions are both insignicant and the TFP estimate is actually positive. One poten-
tial explanation might be that there are gains for Canadian rms that go beyond a pure
reallocation story where acquirers improve the target rms productivity (e.g. access to
superior technology in the U.S. market). For all other categories, however, it seems that
resources are transferred from less to more protable and productive rms.
In a last step, I augment specication (8) with industry xed e¤ects to control for
possible variation in company characteristics across sectors. Block 3 of table 5 contains
estimates for this nal specication which are very similar to the results from (8). Since 1
to 4 are now identied from within-industry variation, this also indicates that acquirer-
target di¤erences are similar irrespective of whether transactions are of cross- or within-
industry nature.
25
7 The Quantitative Importance of the M&A Chan-
nel
The ndings so far are supportive of the view that CUSFTA triggered an increase in
resource transfers via M&A, especially in the smaller Canadian market. It also seems
that these transfers were in most cases from less to more protable and productive rms,
similar to the channels analyzed in the previous literature (i.e. contraction and closure).
A question that naturally arises from these observations is how important inter-rm
resource transfers via M&A are quantitatively, both in absolute terms and relative to the
two other forms of adjustment to freer trade.
While the absence of a control group of rms not engaging in M&A in the Thomson
Financial dataset prevents me from giving a denitive answer to this question, some
progress can be made in a more indirect way. In particular, the available data allow an
analysis of how important resource transfers via M&A are in general, i.e. not necessarily
linked to trade liberalization. Against this baseline, the earlier estimates of CUSFTAs
impact on M&A activity can be judged on their quantitative importance.
To evaluate the general quantitative importance of M&A, I rely again on informa-
tion for publicly traded rms from Compustat North America and Compustat Global
as described in section 4. Of the 331 Canadian and 5816 U.S. rms contained in the
Compustat sample, about a quarter exits during the sample period due to M&A or bank-
ruptcy related reasons with M&A accounting for 82% of all exits (see table 6). That is,
M&A seems to be by far the most important exit form for publicly traded rms in North
America.34
Table 7 delves deeper by quantifying the average annual amount of jobs and produc-
tion (net sales) transferred through the two exit forms. In addition, I also look at the
third form of moving resources away from contracting rms, i.e. decreases in employment
and sales at continuing companies. The resulting gures show that while reductions at
existing rms are the most important channel, M&A is responsible for about 25% of job-
and 30% of sales volume redeployment. These gures are very similar for both the U.S.
and Canada and demonstrate that M&A is indeed a quantitatively important way of
transferring resources between rms. For the publicly traded companies analyzed here, it
34Note that one alternative to the approach taken here would be to use the Compustat sample to
estimate the impact of trade on the three adjustment channels, e.g. using a multinomial probit model.
However, this would only give an estimate of the impact of trade liberalization on the relative incidence
of the channels rather than the magnitude of the resource transfer involved. More importantly, there are
some important limitations of the Compustat sample which prevent such a more detailed analysis. Most
importantly, the focus on publicly traded rms means the number of Canadian rms is too small for
the level of disaggregation used here (I have 140 sectors but only have exit information on 331 rms in
Canada). In addition, I have no information on acquirers so that I cannot perform splits into the impact
of CUSFTA on cross-border and domestic activity which was found to be very di¤erent. Finally, there
are some issues related to the timing of exit and M&A since the date of deletion from Compustat need
not correspond exactly to the actual transaction date.
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also far outweighs exit via bankruptcy as the third adjustment channel.35 It is likely that
exit by bankruptcy will be more important among smaller, non-publicly traded compa-
nies and that turnover at continuing rms will also be higher for this group (see Davis et
al., 1996). On the other hand, it has already been pointed out that publicly traded rms
account for over 80% of manufacturing output and employment in North America. Thus,
the overall quantitative importance of M&A is unlikely to decrease by much in a more
comprehensive sample. Combined with the earlier ndings that CUSFTA led to large in-
creases in domestic M&A activity in Canada (over 60% according to my estimates), these
results suggest that the amount of resource transfer involved was indeed substantial.
8 Conclusions
This paper examined the empirical relevance of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) as a
channel of rm-level adjustment to trade liberalization. Guided by the insights from a
simple theoretical model, I used the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) of
1989 to estimate the impact of freer trade on M&A activity. I argued that CUSFTA
provided an ideal setting for this purpose in many ways. It was a liberalization agree-
ment between industrialized countries with comparatively few restrictions on takeovers;
it represented a source of unanticipated and largely exogenous variation in trade barriers;
and its main instrument - tari¤ cuts - was a direct and easily quantiable trade pol-
icy measure with substantial sectoral variation. Implementing a di¤erence-in-di¤erences
identication strategy, I found a rich set of results. While there does not seem to be a ro-
bust link between cross-border M&A and trade liberalization, resource transfer via M&A
between domestic rms is an empirically relevant phenomenon. This is particularly true
for Canada, where I estimated a tari¤ cut-related increase in domestic M&A activity of
over 60%. There also seems to have been an e¤ect on domestic U.S. transactions, albeit
a substantially smaller one which is consistent with the idea that CUSFTA presented a
much less important trade shock for the large American market.
In order to compare resource transfers via M&A to adjustment via rm- and establish-
ment contraction and exit, I further presented evidence on the nature and quantitative
importance of the M&A channel. Using a large sample of publicly traded rms, I found
that M&A involved a rechannelling of resources from low to high productivity rms (in
particular for the domestic transactions) and that its magnitude is likely to have been
quantitatively important. Taken together, these results suggest that for rms adapt-
ing to freer trade, M&A represents an important alternative to adjustment via closure,
35Note that sell-o¤s or closures of individual divisions or plants will show up under the "reduction
at continuing rms" category (exit by M&A or bankruptcy in Compustat only occurs if the entire rm
is acquired or goes bankrupt). Insofar, the results for the two exit categories can be seen as the lower
bound to what would be obtained from a plant-level analysis.
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contraction, or internal expansion.
There are a number of interesting implications arising from these ndings. In partic-
ular, they highlight the fact that adjustment to freer trade can take less drastic forms
than rm- and plant closure and the associated mass layo¤s of workers and liquidation
of capital. Indeed, if M&A does represent a swifter and more e¢ cient way of transferring
resources between rms, this would have important implications for competition policy.
In particular, one would like antitrust authorities to facilitate the necessary transfer of
resources by reducing restrictions on acquisitions in the wake of trade liberalizations.
Given the generally higher level of restrictions imposed on M&A activity in developing
countries, this proposition could be of particular relevance there. This line of thought is
reminiscent of certain strands in the Corporate Finance literature (in particular Jensen,
1993) which argue that takeovers represent a far superior way of restructuring industries
than internal adjustments or bankruptcy and as such should not face unnecessary legal
restrictions.36
This paper has provided evidence that M&A is an important element of rm-level
reactions to trade liberalization. The ndings presented here suggest a number of im-
portant areas for further research. For example, it would be of interest to replicate my
results for trade liberalization episodes in developing countries where di¤erent regulatory
environments, lower stock market capitalization and more restricted availability of credit
might imply a di¤erent and possibly more restricted role for M&A. Another promising
extension would be to investigate in more detail how M&A compares to the alternative
adjustment channels of exit and internal expansion or contraction. Besides looking at
how rm- and industry-characteristics inuence the choice of adjustment strategy, I am
particularly interested in providing evidence on the relative e¢ ciency of the di¤erent
channels. Using certain exogenous restrictions on M&A (ownership structure, legal bar-
riers to acquisitions etc.), it should in principle be possible to compare the performance
of rms and industries that were able to use M&A as an adjustment mechanism with
other rms and industries that had to rely on other forms of adjustment.
36Some tentative evidence supporting the e¢ ciency of the M&A channel comes from the observation
that M&A seems to lead to overall e¢ ciency gains in most periods and settings (see Andrade et al.,
2001, for a detailed survey). In contrast, liquidation costs are usually found to be substantial, with asset
values decreasing by over 50% (see Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2004).
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Figures and Tables 
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics on Target Industries 
 
Total No. of Acquisitions 1985-1997 
U.S.-
SIC87   
(2-digit) Industry Name 
(1) U.S. by 
U.S. 
(2) U.S. by 
CAN 
(3) CAN by 
U.S. 
(4) CAN by 
CAN 
(5) 
#Establishments 
(U.S.) 
(6) 
#Establishments 
(Canada) 
(7)  Avg. U.S. 
import tariff in 
1988 
(8)  Avg. Can. 
import tariff in 
1988 
          
          
20 Food and kindred products 1497 46 52 219 20,749 3,440 3.9% 5.9% 
21 Tobacco manufactures 40 0 0 2 119 20 20.7% 14.4% 
22 Textile mill products 385 11 16 37 6,035 757 8.7% 13.5% 
23 Apparel and other textile products 478 8 11 16 23,224 2,604 9.4% 15.8% 
24 Lumber and wood products 257 15 14 90 22,665 3,110 2.2% 4.5% 
25 Furniture and fixtures 314 3 2 32 11,796 1,927 2.2% 10.7% 
26 Paper and allied products 531 30 19 125 6,401 818 3.4% 8.8% 
27 Printing and publishing 1873 69 30 209 63,179 5,425 0.5% 2.0% 
28 Chemicals and allied products 2550 70 65 135 12,138 1,204 3.8% 6.2% 
29 Petroleum and coal products 216 9 8 21 2,168 140 0.7% 0.8% 
30 Rubber and misc. plastics products 819 27 31 64 15,774 1,607 4.5% 8.8% 
31 Leather and leather products 121 0 3 4 2,026 320 7.5% 12.6% 
32 Stone, clay, glass, and concrete products 389 15 20 42 16,279 1,612 1.8% 3.9% 
33 Primary metal industries 749 21 38 73 6,479 515 3.4% 4.5% 
34 Fabricated metal products 1076 38 38 82 36,835 3,236 2.2% 7.0% 
35 Industrial machinery and equipment 2843 72 98 189 54,143 4,635 2.6% 5.2% 
36 Electrical and electronic equipment 2657 71 87 162 16,649 988 3.5% 6.3% 
37 Transportation equipment 999 24 36 87 11,393 1,256 0.9% 5.5% 
38 Instruments and related products 2254 30 39 53 11,091 987 4.2% 7.0% 
39 Miscellaneous manufacturing industries 612 17 15 21 17,217 1,720 3.8% 6.2% 
          
 Total (sum or mean) 20660 576 622 1663 356,362 36,320 4.5% 7.5% 
Notes: Columns 1-4 show the total number of takeovers of firms with primary activity in manufacturing (SIC 20-39) during 1985-1997. The columns give figures by two-digit industry for four different M&A 
categories: 1) Takeovers of U.S. firms by other U.S. firms; 2) takeovers of U.S. firms by Canadian firms; 3) takeovers of Canadian firms by U.S. firms; and 4) takeovers of Canadian firms by other Canadian 
firms. Acquirers can have primary activity within or outside manufacturing (see table 2 for a breakdown of acquirers' primary industries). Columns 5 and 6 display the average number of establishments in 
1985-1997 for the U.S. and Canada. Columns 7 and 8 show two-digit average import tariffs levied by the U.S. and Canada on each other’s manufacturing products in 1988.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics on Acquirer Industries 
 
 
 United States  Canada 
Sector (1) Number 
(2) % of total 
manufacturing 
M&A 
(3) secondary SIC 
in manuf. (%) 
(4) at least one 3-
digit SIC-code in 
common with 
target (%)  (5) Number 
(6) % of total 
manufacturing 
M&A 
(7) secondary 
SIC in manuf. 
(%) 
(8) at least one 3-
digit SIC-code in 
common with 
target (%) 
          
          
Manufacturing firms (SIC 2-3) 14878 70.1% 100.0% 55.0%  1583 69.3% 100.0% 58.5% 
- Same 3-digit industry 7168 33.8% 100.0% 100.0%  831 36.4% 100.0% 100.0% 
- Same 2-digit industry but not same 3-digit industry 2808 13.2% 100.0% 13.0%  303 13.3% 100.0% 15.9% 
- Different 2-digit industries 4902 23.1% 100.0% 8.5%  449 19.6% 100.0% 4.7% 
          
Non-manufacturing firms 3555 16.7% 26.1% 3.0%  472 20.7% 22.6% 2.7% 
- Agriculture, Fishing & Hunting (sic 1) 69 0.3% 50.7% 5.8%  10 0.4% 50.0% 10.0% 
- Mining (sic 10-14) 260 1.2% 29.7% 1.1%  65 2.8% 10.6% 0.0% 
- Construction (sic 15-17) 96 0.5% 32.3% 2.1%  8 0.4% 50.0% 0.0% 
- Transportation, communications, and utilities (sic 4) 417 2.0% 28.1% 2.4%  62 2.7% 45.2% 0.0% 
- Wholesale trade (sic 50-51) 713 3.4% 36.7% 6.2%  77 3.4% 24.7% 5.2% 
- Retail Trade (sic 52-59) 206 1.0% 17.5% 3.9%  24 1.1% 20.8% 4.2% 
- Finance, insurance, and real estate (sic 60-67) 693 3.3% 10.1% 0.1%  140 6.1% 1.4% 0.0% 
- Services industry (sic 7/8) 1078 5.1% 27.6% 3.1%  86 3.8% 43.0% 8.1% 
- Government (sic 9) 23 0.1% 0.0% 0.0%  14 0.6% 0.0% 0.0% 
          
Investors, n.e.c (sic 6799) 2803 13.2% 0.0% 0.0%  216 9.5% 0.0% 0.0% 
          
Total number of manufacturing M&A 21236 100.0%    2285 100.0%   
          
Notes: Columns (1) and (5) show the total number of M&A transactions involving manufacturing targets in the U.S. and Canada with acquirers having their principal activity in the SIC-code listed on the left. 
Columns (2) and (6) express these numbers as % of the total number of manufacturing M&A transaction in the respective country.  Columns (3) and (7) list the fraction of acquirers from a given SIC-code 
that have a primary OR secondary three-digit SIC-code in manufacturing. Columns (4) and (8) similarly list the fraction of acquirers that have at least one three-digit manufacturing SIC-code (primary or 
secondary) in common with the target. 
 
Table 3: Impact of tariff reductions on number of M&A transactions - Full Sample 
 
 Dependent Variable: Number of Takeovers 
 
1) Canada by Canada 2) U.S. by Canada 3) U.S. by U.S. 4) Canada by U.S. Controls 
βCbyC dpost Obs. βUbyC dpost Obs. βUbyU dpost Obs. βCbyU dpost Obs.  
Measure of tariff cuts (∆) 
      
(1) ∆ = log( t1988-t1997) 0.365 2.887 280 0.103 1.121 280 0.068 0.752 280 0.076 1.755 280 No 
  (4.18)** (10.14)**  (0.97) (2.81)**  (3.68)** (11.17)**  (0.45) (3.41)**   
(2) ∆ = t1988-t1997 8.310 1.295 280 6.940 0.448 280 0.979 0.471 280 -6.561 1.941 280 No 
  (3.58)** (10.04)**  (1.52) (2.98)**  (1.89)+ (19.45)**  (1.80)+ (7.89)**   
(3) ∆ = 1(dt>dt,50%) 0.370 1.554 280 0.479 0.417 280 0.224 0.380 280 -0.250 1.681 280 No 
 (2.77)** (18.52)** (3.01)** (3.87)** (8.74)** (20.16)** (1.23) (11.02)**  
(4) ∆ = log( t1988-t1997) 0.364 2.871 280 0.090 0.787 280 0.069 0.708 280 0.119 1.698 280 Yes 
  (4.12)** (9.15)**  (0.85) (1.85)+  (3.71)** (10.07)**  (0.67) (2.93)**   
(5) ∆ = t1988-t1997 8.419 1.265 280 6.885 0.137 280 1.224 0.434 280 -6.598 1.811 280 Yes 
  (3.57)** (7.47)**  (1.53) (0.70)  (1.84)+ (11.98)**  (1.78)+ (7.04)**   
(6) ∆ = 1(dt>dt,50%) 0.380 1.512 280 0.452 0.149 280 0.224 0.368 280 -0.232 1.530 280 Yes 
  (2.83)** (13.56)**  (2.82)** (0.92)  (8.72)** (13.43)**  (1.14) (8.43)**   
                              
Notes: Table shows coefficient estimates from fixed effects Poisson regressions with conditional mean µit=exp(di+dpre+dpost+β*dpost*∆). Figures in brackets below coefficient estimates are robust t-stats based 
on standard errors clustered at the industry level. The dependent variable (µit ) is the number of takeovers of manufacturing firms per 3-digit industry and time-period (pre-CUSFTA and post-CUSFTA). The 
regressors are transformations of the absolute change in industry tariffs 1988-1997, interacted with a post-CUSFTA period-dummy (dpost*∆): lines 1 and 4 use logs of absolute changes, lines 2 and 5 use 
absolute changes and lines 3 and 6 use a binary indicator (= 1 if an industry is among the 50% of industries with the highest tariff cuts). Coefficient estimates for these tariff change variables are listed under 
the first column of each M&A category (columns containing βs). The four categories included are: 1) takeovers of Canadian firms by other Canadian firms; 2) takeovers of U.S. firms by Canadian firms; 3) 
takeovers of U.S. firms by other U.S. firms; and 4) takeovers of Canadian firms by U.S. firms. All regressions also include industry fixed effects (di) and a period-dummy for the post-FTA period (estimates 
shown under the columns with the heading "dpost "). The excluded category is the pre-CUSFTA period dummy dpre. Regressions 4-6 additionally contain the number of takeovers in the EU in the same 
industry and time-period (see text for details). +, * and ** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, the 5% and the 1%-level, respectively. 
Table 4: Impact of tariff reductions on number of M&A transactions - Subsamples 
 
  Dependent Variable: Number of Takeovers  
 
1) Canada by Canada 2) U.S. by Canada 3) U.S. by U.S. 4) Canada by U.S. Controls 
 
βCbyC dpost Obs. βUbyC dpost Obs. βUbyU dpost Obs. βCbyU dpost Obs.  
 
Measure of tariff cuts  
(∆) 
       
(1) ∆ = log( t1988-t1997) 0.311 2.613 280 0.152 1.093 280 0.045 0.693 280 0.320 2.706 280 Yes 
  (3.21)** (7.56)**  (1.40) (2.43)*  (1.83)+ (8.50)**  (1.74)+ (4.32)**   
(2) ∆ = t1988-t1997 8.194 1.220 280 12.156 0.031 280 0.772 0.556 280 -3.294 1.907 280 Yes 
  (3.20)** (6.72)**  (2.46)* (0.15)  (0.99) (13.14)**  (0.82) (6.05)**   
(3) ∆ = 1(dt>dt,50%) 0.411 1.537 280 0.486 0.179 280 0.176 0.494 280 -0.144 1.781 280 Yes E
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 (2.79)** (12.04)** (2.81)** (1.04) (5.97)** (15.54)** (0.67) (7.83)**  
(4) ∆ = log( t1988-t1997) 0.422 2.878 280 0.045 0.741 280 0.023 0.506 280 0.246 2.365 280 Yes 
  (4.50)** (8.54)**  (0.39) (1.60)  (1.18) (6.72)**  (1.30) (3.78)**   
(5) ∆ = t1988-t1997 9.135 1.021 280 5.421 0.262 280 -0.256 0.442 280 -4.733 1.919 280 Yes 
  (3.48)** (5.47)**  (1.11) (1.22)  (0.36) (11.40)**  (1.19) (5.94)**   
(6) ∆ = 1(dt>dt,50%) 0.461 1.384 280 0.329 0.279 280 0.170 0.343 280 -0.175 1.712 280 Yes 
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 (3.05)** (10.61)** (1.87)+ (1.55) (6.14)** (11.66)** (0.81) (7.45)**  
(7) ∆ = log( t1988-t1997) 0.362 2.787 280 -0.573 -2.300 280 0.032 0.812 280 0.592 3.462 280 Yes 
  (2.30)* (5.05)**  (1.48) (1.56)  (0.94) (6.19)**  (1.74)+ (3.05)**   
(8) ∆ = t1988-t1997 7.385 1.223 280 24.876 -1.162 280 1.645 0.660 280 -1.135 1.706 280 Yes 
  (1.78)+ (4.07)**  (2.50)* (2.72)**  (1.79)+ (9.39)**  (0.14) (2.82)**   
(9) ∆ = 1(dt>dt,50%) 0.384 1.521 280 0.365 -0.653 280 0.294 0.561 280 -0.602 1.950 280 Yes 
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 (1.66)+ (7.40)** (1.04) (1.80)+ (6.20)** (10.48)** (1.61) (4.76)**  
(10) ∆ = log( t1988-t1997) 0.348 2.903 280 0.167 1.232 280 0.140 1.310 280 0.408 3.553 280 Yes 
  (2.99)** (5.80)**  (1.29) (2.37)*  (5.28)** (12.91)**  (1.54) (3.87)**   
(11) ∆ = t1988-t1997 8.715 1.934 280 19.963 -0.097 280 2.518 0.731 280 3.117 2.102 280 Yes 
  (2.52)* (7.70)**  (3.42)** (0.43)  (2.47)* (13.69)**  (0.47) (4.64)**   
(12) ∆ = 1(dt>dt,50%) 0.368 2.298 280 0.766 0.156 280 0.254 0.705 280 0.219 2.175 280 Yes 
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   (1.91)+ (12.79)**  (4.04)** (0.86)  (6.93)** (17.75)**  (0.77) (7.08)**    
Notes: Table shows coefficient estimates from fixed effects Poisson regressions with conditional mean µit=exp(di+dpre+dpost+β*dpost*∆). Figures in brackets below coefficient estimates are robust t-stats based 
on standard errors clustered at the industry level. The dependent variable (µit ) is the number of takeovers of manufacturing firms per 3-digit industry and time-period (pre-CUSFTA and post-CUSFTA). The 
table displays results for four different subsamples of manufacturing targets (see first table column and text for details). The regressors are transformations of the absolute change in industry tariffs 1988-
1997, interacted with a post-CUSFTA period-dummy (dpost*∆): lines 1, 4, 7 and 10 use logs of absolute changes, lines 2, 5, 8 and 11 use absolute changes and lines 3, 6, 9 and 12 use a binary indicator (= 1 
if an industry is among the 50% of industries with the highest tariff cuts). Coefficient estimates for these tariff change variables are listed under the first column of each M&A category (columns containing βs). 
The four categories included are: 1) takeovers of Canadian firms by other Canadian firms; 2) takeovers of U.S. firms by Canadian firms, 3) takeovers of U.S. firms by other U.S. firms, and 4) takeovers of 
Canadian firms by U.S. firms. All regressions also include industry fixed effects (di) and a period-dummy for the post-FTA period (estimates shown under the columns with the heading "dpost "). The excluded 
category is the pre-CUSFTA period (dpre). All regressions additionally contain the number of takeovers in the EU in the same industry and time-period (see text for details). +, * and ** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, the 5% and the 1%-level, respectively. 
Table 5: Comparison Acquirers – Targets 
Specifi-
cation Regressors 
(1) Net Sales (Mio 
1995 USD) 
(2) Employees 
('000s) 
(3) Pretax income per 
employee ('000 USD) 
(4) Pretax income 
per net sales (USD) 
(5) Labor product. 
(logs) (6) TFP (logs) 
Year 
dummies? 
Three-digit 
industry 
dummies? 
     
Constant 970.057 11.112 9.168 0.052 4.899 3.761 
 (12.24)** (11.36)** (6.24)** (6.62)** (130.61)** (123.13)** 
Target dummy -882.693 -8.508 -14.657 -0.096 -0.120 -0.040 
 (11.91)** (9.94)** (5.58)** (7.92)** (5.08)** (2.45)* 
(1) 
R-squared 0.14 0.09 0.14 0.12 0.06 0.04 
Yes No 
Target CAN by CAN -656.089 -5.506 -8.483 -0.074 -0.169 -0.129 
 (4.51)** (2.41)* (2.51)* (5.27)** (2.90)** (3.09)** 
Target U.S. by U.S. -890.943 -8.589 -14.666 -0.097 -0.119 -0.037 
 (11.38)** (9.50)** (5.57)** (7.60)** (5.02)** (2.25)* 
Target U.S. by CAN. -643.234 -6.759 -23.749 -0.147 -0.034 0.116 
 (4.56)** (3.66)** (3.97)** (4.58)** (0.31) (1.35) 
Target CAN by U.S. -1,182.914 -9.492 -17.714 -0.110 -0.087 -0.140 
 (5.78)** (5.18)** (3.06)** (4.81)** (0.85) (2.09)* 
(2) 
R-squared 0.14 0.10 0.14 0.12 0.06 0.04 
Yes No 
Target CAN by CAN -484.966 -3.393 -8.743 -0.073 -0.145 -0.098 
 (3.03)** (1.71)+ (2.54)* (5.45)** (2.49)* (2.23)* 
Target U.S. by U.S. -862.553 -8.202 -14.941 -0.095 -0.092 -0.030 
 (9.97)** (7.03)** (5.20)** (7.11)** (4.55)** (2.32)* 
Target U.S. by CAN. -506.652 -6.489 -22.165 -0.133 -0.025 0.078 
 (3.00)** (2.92)** (3.43)** (4.25)** (0.29) (1.13) 
Target CAN by U.S. -1,161.030 -9.977 -17.917 -0.113 -0.127 -0.140 
 (5.76)** (4.97)** (2.82)** (4.65)** (1.53) (2.37)* 
(3) 
R-squared 0.27 0.26 0.21 0.17 0.24 0.26 
Yes Yes 
 Observations 12613 9080 5566 7049 8466 7956   
Notes: Table shows results for OLS regressions (robust t-values in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered at the 3-digit industry level). The dependent variables are the company characteristics 
listed across the top of columns 1-6. Regressors in specification (1) include a constant and a dummy for whether a company is a target. Specifications (2) and (3) include separate intercepts and target 
dummy terms for all four M&A categories (see text for full specification). The table shows coefficient estimates for the four target dummies: “Target CAN by CAN” (targets in takeovers of Canadian firms by 
other Canadian firms), “Target U.S. by U.S.” (targets in takeovers of U.S. firms by other U.S. firms), “Target U.S. by CAN” (targets in takeovers of U.S. firms by Canadian firms), and “Target CAN by U.S.” 
(targets in takeovers of Canadian firms by U.S. firms). Also included are year fixed effects (all specifications) and 3-digit industry fixed effects (specification 3 only). +, * and ** indicate statistical significance 
at the 10%, the 5% and the 1%-level, respectively. 
 Table 6: Firm exit via M&A and Bankruptcy 
 Canada United States Total 
Firms active in part or all of 1985-1997 331 5816 6147 
Firms exiting via bankruptcy or M&A (number and % of active firms) 43 13.0% 1606 27.6% 1649 26.8% 
- Bankruptcy/Liquidation (number and % of total exit) 4 9.3% 287 17.9% 291 17.6% 
- M&A (number and % of total exit) 39 90.7% 1319 82.1% 1358 82.4% 
Notes: Table shows numbers of publicly traded manufacturing firms active in all or part of 1985-1997 and total occurrences of exit via M&A or bankruptcy among these firms. 
 
 
Table 7: Resource Transfer via Contraction, M&A and Bankruptcy 
Yearly Sample Averages 1985-1997 Canada United States Total 
    
(1) Total employment ('000s) 757.1 15570.2 16327.3 
(2) Gross job reductions at continuing firms ('000s) 32.5 745.0 777.6 
(3) Job reductions through bankruptcy/liquidation ('000s) 0.5 11.2 11.6 
(4) Job transfers through M&A ('000s) 14.3 263.3 277.6 
(5) Total job transfers ('000s) – sum of (2)-(4) 47.3 1019.5 1066.8 
(6) Total job transfers as % of employment – (5)/(1) 6.2% 6.5% 6.5% 
(7) M&A as % of total job transfers – (4)/(5) 30.2% 25.8% 26.0% 
    
(1) Total output (mill. 1995 USD) 156,764 3,017,341 3,174,105 
(2) Gross output reductions at continuing firms (mill. 1995 USD) 7,159 96,636 103,795 
(3) Output reductions through bankruptcy/liquidation (mill. 1995 USD) 101 1,374 1,476 
(4) Output transfers through M&A (mill. 1995 USD) 3,812 42,744 46,556 
(5) Total output transfers (mill. 1995 USD) – sum of (2)-(4) 11,869 140,754 152,623 
(6) Total output transfers as % of output – (5)/(1) 7.6% 4.7% 4.8% 
(7) M&A as % of total output transfers – (4)/(5) 32.1% 30.4% 30.5% 
    
Notes: Table shows the amount of job and output transfers via contraction at continuing firms and via exit by bankruptcy/liquidation and M&A. ''Total employment'' and ''Total output'' are obtained by 
summing over all firms active in a given year. ''Gross job/output reductions at continuing firms'' are the sum over all employment/output reductions at continuing firms as compared to the previous year. 
''Job/output reductions through bankruptcy/liquidation'' and ''Job/output transfers through M&A'' are the sum over the last available employment/sales figures for firms exiting the dataset in a given year due 
to bankruptcy/liquidation or M&A (see text for details on the sample construction). 
Figure 1: Aggregate Number of M&A Transactions, 1985-1997 
  
  
Notes: Figures show the number of takeovers of firms with primary activity in manufacturing, expressed as indices relative to 1988. Acquirers can have primary activities within or outside manufacturing (see 
table 2 for a breakdown of acquirers' primary industries). The four graphs give numbers for four M&A categories: a) U.S. firms taken over by other U.S. firms, b) U.S. firms taken over by Canadian firms, c) 
Canadian firms taken over by other Canadian firms, and d) Canadian firms taken over by U.S. firms. 
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Figure 2: Aggregate Number of M&A Transactions, Most vs. Least Affected Industries 
 
Notes: Figures show the number of takeovers of firms with primary activity in manufacturing, expressed as indices relative to 1988. Acquirers can have primary activities within or outside manufacturing (see 
table 2 for a breakdown of acquirers' primary industries). Each graph shows numbers for two groups of target industries: the 50% of industries with the highest and the 50% of industries with the lowest cuts 
in domestic tariffs from 1988-1997. The four graphs give numbers for four M&A categories: a) U.S. firms taken over by other U.S. firms, b) U.S. firms taken over by Canadian firms, c) Canadian firms taken 
over by other Canadian firms, and d) Canadian firms taken over by U.S. firms. 
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A Theoretical Derivations
A.1 Entry- and Export Productivity Thresholds
Recall that only those rms will become active for which the sum of discounted future
operating prots from serving the domestic market is at least equal to the setup costs.
That is, it will hold for the marginal rm that pq
1    q' i1  = Fi= (1  ). Similarly, for
the marginal exporting rm we have pxqx
1    qx' i1  = Fxi=(1   ). Substituing for prices
(p and px) and quantities (q and qx), we obtain the entry and exporting thresholds ('
and 'x) as:
' =

iF
P  1(   1) 1
1=( 1)
(9)
and
'x =

 1iFx
P  1 (   1) 1
1=( 1)
(10)
Note that the ratio of these two thresholds can be solved for 'x as:
'x =

Fx
F
1=( 1)
' (11)
Since every rms that wants to export has to incur both the domestic setup costs Fi=(1 
) and the exporting setup costs Fxi=(1   ), an exporter will always also sell on the
domestic market. That is, it will hold that 'x  '.37 On the other hand, there will be
a separation into exporters and non-exporters as long as
 
Fx
F
1=( 1)
 > 1. Since there
is strong evidence that such a separation is an empirically relevant phenomenon (e.g.
Bernard and Jensen, 2004), I assume in the following that this condition is satised and
that it thus holds that 'x > '
. That is, exporting rms are always more productive
than non-exporting rms.
Returning to the entry thresholds (9) and (10), I now assume that productivity levels
follow a Pareto distribution (i.e. with density v(') = aa' (a+1) with  > 0, a >  1 >
0, and '  ). With this assumption and after some algebraic manipulations, I can
explicitly solve for ' and 'x as:
' =

aa
a   + 1MeFi
1=a "
1 +  a

Fx
F
 1 a
 1
#1=a
and
37This might seem puzzling in view of condition (11) which seems to imply that 'x < '
 for low
enough values of FxF and  . However, note that '

x is the export threshold for a rm that has already
entered the domestic market (the setup costs Fi= (1  ) are not included in the zero prot condition
determining 'x).
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'x =

aa
a   + 1MeFi
1=a "
Fx
F
a=( 1)
a +

Fx
F
#1=a
A.2 Capital Demand and Prices
With Pareto-distributed productivity levels, capital demand for domestic production and
exporting at active rms can be written as:
kd(') =


   1i
 
' 1P  1 + F = (   1)F

'
'
 1
+ F
kx(') =


   1i
 
' 1P  1 + Fx =  1 (   1)F

'
'
 1
+ Fx
Integrating over all active rms and using the solutions for ' and 'x from the last
section, I can determine overall capital demand for domestic production and exporting
as:
Kd =
Z 1
'='
kd (')Med' = i
 1

a    + 1
a
"
1 +  a

Fx
F
 a 1
 1
# 1
(12)
and
Kx =
Z 1
'='x
kx (')Med' = i
 1

a    + 1
a
"
1 + a

Fx
F
  a 1
 1
# 1
(13)
Finally, using the M&A market clearing condition Kd +Kx = K, I can solve for i as:
i = K 1

a    + 1
a

Plugging this result back into (12) and (13), I obtain the results for Kd and Kx presented
in the main text.
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B Linking Tari¤ and M&A Data
The tari¤ data are constructed as described in Head and Ries (1999). U.S. tari¤s prior
to CUSFTA are taken from Government of Canada (1988), Canadian tari¤s from Lester
and Morehen (1987). These publications provide tari¤s for around 100 industries, roughly
corresponding to the 3-digit level of the Canadian industry classication of 1980 (CAN-
SIC80). Tari¤ reductions after 1988 are calculated by determining to which so-called
stagingcategory an industry had been assigned under CUSFTA. The staging category
agreed upon determined the rate by which tari¤ protection was being phased out. Most
industries had their tari¤s reduced in equal parts from 1989 to 1997. A smaller number
were placed on a ve year phase-out and a handful opted for immediate elimination. Note
that the above two publications do not provide data for 1985 and 1986. However, Lester
and Morehen (1987) does contain Canadian tari¤s for 1979 which I interpolate to 1987
to get some impression of tari¤ changes in that period. As other studies (e.g. Gu et
al., 2003), I nd changes in 1985-1988 to be small both in absolute terms and compared
to the subsequent cuts implemented via CUSFTA. In my econometric analysis (sections
5.2 and 5.3), I will thus set the pre-CUSFTA change in tari¤s equal to zero. Using my
interpolated data for the regressions involving Canadian tari¤ cuts yields very similar
results to the ones presented in this paper (with the exception of the binary measure for
most-least a¤ected industries which shows too little variation over time - 80% of industries
stay in the same group pre and post CUSFTA).
In order to link the tari¤ data to the data on M&A transactions, I assign each M&A
deal to a 4-digit category of the 1987 U.S. industry classication (US-SIC87) based on
the primary eld of activity of the target company or division. In order to determine the
tari¤ facing that industry, I use a correspondence between CAN-SIC80 and US-SIC87
provided by Statistics Canada. The mapping was unique in about 70% of cases in the
sense that a U.S.-industry was matched to a unique tari¤ rate. For the remaining 30%, I
used averages of tari¤s weighted according to the average number of establishments in the
CAN-SIC80 category (this arguably captures the "M&A potential" of an industry better
than e.g. value added or output weights would do: ceteris paribus, a transaction is more
likely to occur in an industry with more establishments; however, using simple averages
does not qualitatively a¤ect my results). Finally, I aggregated the U.S.-data up to the
3-digit level (140 industries), again using the number of rms in a 4-digit category as tari¤
weights. This aggregation was done in order to reduce the number of zero-transaction
industries (thus mitigating problems of an excess number of zeros in the xed e¤ects
Poisson regressions) and to reect more accurately the less disaggregated nature of the
underlying tari¤ data.
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